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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most prominent aspects of American popular culture is 
major league sports.1  They are pervasive, not only in economic and 
political arenas, but also within the spheres of community values and 
ethics.2  We look to athletes as bastions of morality and social 
consciousness, which puts a heavy emphasis on sports leagues and how 
they adjudicate the conduct of athletes both on and off the field.3  This is 
why the recent cheating scandal perpetrated by the New England Patriots 
and, most likely, Tom Brady garnered national and legal attention. 
Specifically, the improper conduct involved Tom Brady using 
underinflated footballs in the 2015 American Football Conference 
(“AFC”) Championship game.4  As a result, not only was Brady 
suspended, but the New England Patriots were fined $1 million and lost 
two future draft picks.5  These punitive measures were dictated by Roger 
Goodell, the National Football League (“NFL”) Commissioner, who 
serves as arbitrator for all team and player disciplinary issues.6  This 
“Deflategate” incident, particularly the severity of the commissioner’s 
sanction, illustrates the magnitude of a sports commissioner’s power.  
The NFL Commissioner’s power, however, is not unique; commissioners 
in other major sports leagues—Major League Baseball (“MLB”), 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”), National Hockey League 
(“NHL”)—have doled out equally strong sanctions.7  The 
commissioners’ power to discipline players and teams for misconduct 
comes from the respective Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) 
of each league, as well as the leagues’ constitutions and by-laws.8 
In the case of Roger Goodell, under the terms of the 2011 NFL CBA, 
“[t]he System [Commissioner] shall make findings of fact and 
determinations of relief including, without limitation, damages . . . 
 
 1  Kenneth J. Marci, Not Just a Game: Sport and Society in the United States, 4 INQUIRIES 
J., no. 8 (2012), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=676. 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  David Bunam & Rich Cimini, NFL Suspends Tom Brady for 4 Games, ESPN (May 
12, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/12867594/punishments-handed-tom-brady-
new-england-patriots-deflategate. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council 
and the Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011), http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-barg 
aining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [hereinafter 2011 NFL CBA]. 
 7  Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary 
Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 93 (2014). 
 8  Id. 
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injunctive relief, fines, and specific performance.”9  There are no 
provisions that currently limit this power, prompting scholars to propose 
alterations to NFL regulations.10  Many associated with the league believe 
the unfettered authority afforded to Goodell under the new CBA is unfair, 
with no analogues in other major sports leagues.11  The power is so 
disconcerting to some that they are anxiously awaiting the year 2021, 
when the CBA will be renegotiated and there will be an opportunity to 
address Goodell’s authority.12  For the first time in recent memory, ratings 
for the NFL dropped, possibly due to an unprecedented public backlash 
over the league’s authority based on the handling of various player and 
team issues, especially Deflategate.13 
The issue with commissioner authority in the major sports leagues 
is that it unfairly prejudices the players and coaches, placing their actions 
under a microscope on and off the field, court, or ice.  However, while 
some argue that the power of the NFL Commissioner exceeds that of 
other leagues,14 this Note posits that his authority is not incongruous with 
that of other sports commissioners and that the commissioner authority 
across all leagues is too broad.  The issue with their authority revolves 
around their unfettered ability to punish players for both on and off field 
activities due to the ubiquity of “the best interest of the league” clause.  
Part II of the Note will examine the CBAs of each of the four major sports 
leagues in the United States—based on highest revenues,15 similarities in 
textual construction, and popularity amongst the American people—to 
elucidate the similarities in the powers of the commissioners.16  Part III 
will examine the Deflategate controversy, specifically, in order to show 
how the issues of review result in the plenary authority of sports 
commissioners.  Part IV proposes legislation that would ameliorate these 
 
 9  Id. at 113. 
 10  Eric L. Einhorn, Between the Hash Marks: The Absolute Power the NFL’s Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Grants Its Commissioner, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 393, 395 (2016).  
 11  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 94. 
 12  Kevin Van Valkenburg, Power Mad, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.espn.com 
/nfl/story/_/id/8769645/has-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-power-gone-too-far-espn-maga 
zine. 
 13  Kevin Seifert, NFL Facing Unprecedented Rebellion From Teams, Players, ESPN 
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/218163/nfl-facing-unprece 
dented-rebellion-from-the-inside. 
 14  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 94. 
 15  Steven Kutz, NFL Took in $13 Billion in Revenue Last Season—See How It Stack Up 
Against Other Pro Sports Leagues, MARKET WATCH (July 2, 2016), http://www.market 
watch.com/story/the-nfl-made-13-billion-last-season-see-how-it-stacks-up-against-other-
leagues-2016-07-01.  
 16  Darren Rovell, NFL Most Popular For 30th Year in a Row, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/10354114/harris-poll-nfl-most-popular-mlb-2nd. 
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issues of review, while also expediting CBA negotiations, thus saving 
leagues valuable time and revenue. 
II. THE POWERS THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE NFL, MLB, NBA, AND NHL 
The focus of commissioner review is based on the constitutions and 
by-laws,17 because they lay out the original powers of the commissioners 
that are then limited, qualified, or altered.  Then the focus should shift to 
the CBAs, whose functions are to detail qualified commissioner authority 
for the period that they are valid, before the new player and league 
negotiations take place.18 
One must first look at the constitutions and by-laws because they 
can be clearer in enumerating the exact powers of the commissioner, 
making them important benchmarks for their authority.19 
“Historically, league commissioners have enjoyed expansive 
authority to regulate their leagues.  The constitutions and by-laws for each 
league are the starting points in defining the authority of each league 
[C]omission.”20  CBAs are significant because they offer “professional 
athletes an opportunity to impose checks on commissioner power, such 
as rule change restrictions and arbitration processes, while also reserving 
certain powers for the commissioner.”21  Any real disparity between 
commissioner powers enumerated in the CBAs can be accounted for by 
the relative power of the players’ union of the respective leagues.22  As a 
result, the stronger the players’ union, the weaker the authority of the 
commissioner under the CBA is likely to be.23 
A. The MLB Commissioner’s Authority 
In terms of the MLB, the MLB Player’s Association (“MLBPA”) is 
quite strong due to the league’s long history, with nearly a century of 
player-Commissioner negotiations, and is, ostensibly, able to put 
significant restrictions on the power of the Commissioner in the CBA.24  
However, under both the Constitution and the CBA, the Commissioner 
has pervasive authority for disciplinary purposes.25  Under the 
 
 17  Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner, 7 
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 48 (2010). 
 18  Kevin J. Murphy, Determinants of Contract Duration in Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 45 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 352, 352 (1992). 
 19  Id.  
 20  Id.  
 21  Id.  
 22  Id.  
 23  Wilson, supra note 17. 
 24  Wilson, supra note 17. 
 25  Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 30 Major League Clubs and the Major 
MONDELLI 2017 
2017] THE ROGER GOODELL STANDARD 195 
Constitution, the Commissioner has the authority to impose the 
following: 
(a) a reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of 
representation in Major League Meetings; (c) suspension or 
removal of any owner, officer or employee of a Major League 
Club; (d) temporary or permanent ineligibility of a player; (e) 
a fine, not to exceed $2,000,000 in the case of a Major League 
Club, not to exceed $500,000 in the case of an owner, officer 
or employee, and in an amount consistent with the then-
current Basic Agreement with the Major League Baseball 
Players Association, in the case of a player; (f) loss of the 
benefit of any or all of the Major League Rules, including but 
not limited to the denial or transfer of player selection rights 
provided by Major League Rules 4 and 5; and (g) such other 
actions as the Commissioner may deem appropriate.26 
The Commissioner is also a member of the Executive Council, an 
entity comprised of eight team owners, or “chairmen,”27 responsible for 
protecting the position of baseball in public confidence and investigating 
whether or not there should be rule changes regarding various matters.28  
Under the Constitution, the phrase “best interests of baseball” has been 
utilized to broadly extend the authority of the Commissioner.29  The 
phrase was cited numerous times by various Commissioners in 
justification of the punitive actions taken against players.30 
In terms of the CBA, “a Player may be subjected to disciplinary 
action for just cause by his Club, the Senior Vice President, Standards 
and On-Field Operations or the Commissioner.”31  However, when a 
player feels as though he was punished unfairly, he may file a grievance 
in order to be made whole, subsequent to the punishment.32  The 
legitimacy of the grievance is determined by either a panel chair or, more 
commonly, by a tripartite committee of arbiters, with two of the arbiters 
being supplied by each party and an impartial third arbiter selected by 
both.33  If the parties do not agree upon an impartial arbiter from the 
 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, (2016), art. XII, https://ipmall. 
law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/2012MLB_MLBP
A_CBA.pdf [hereinafter 2012-2016 MLB CBA]; MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. II (1921), 
https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/Leag
ue%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf. 
 26  Id. at art. II, § 3. 
 27  Id. at art. II, § 1. 
 28  Id. at art. III, § 2. 
 29  Michael Hirsley, ‘Best Interests’ Clause Has Benefited Commissioners, CHI. TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 18, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-03-18/sports/0403180405_1_fay-
vincent-interests-commissioners.  
 30  Id.  
 31  2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XII. 
 32  2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI. 
 33  2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI. 
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Association and the Labor Relations Department (“LDR”), they must 
jointly request that the American Arbitration Association provide them 
with a list of appropriate candidates.34  Similar to the process of voir dire, 
the parties go down the list until one name is agreed upon.35  However, 
either party may remove the arbiter at any time during the negotiations.36  
Essentially, the Commissioner, as the head of the league, has more 
bargaining power in these situations because he can delay the proceedings 
and select the arbiter that he wants to adjudicate the matters, even though 
it technically violates the CBA.37 
While it is true that both the players and the league can take 
advantage of these procedural loopholes, pressure from fans and owners 
coupled with the risk of losing income allow the league to draw out the 
process.38  Instances where grievances are appropriate are limited to 
conduct on the field and in the ballpark.39  That still leaves “[t]hose 
complaints that involve the preservation of the integrity of the game to be 
different from the routine grievances of an industrial employment 
relationship, and it is understandable that the commissioner of baseball 
believes that he must have final and binding authority to resolve such 
complaints.”40  As evidenced by the detailed powers of the MLB 
Commissioner, his authority is far-reaching. 
B. The NHL Commissioner’s Authority 
The position of the NHL Commissioner—currently held by Gary 
Bettman—does not date back to the 1920s, like the MLB 
Commissioner.41  Instead, the position of NHL Commissioner was 
created in 1993, with its powers amended under the NHL Constitution in 
2009.42  Similar to the role of the MLB Commissioner, the NHL 
Commissioner is “charged with protecting the integrity of the game of 
professional hockey and preserving public confidence in the league,”43 
which gives the Commissioner broad discretionary power over matters: 
 
 34  2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI. 
 35  2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI. 
 36  2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI. 
 37  See 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI. 
 38  Mark L. Goldstein, Arbitration of Grievance and Salary Disputes in Professional 
Baseball Evolution of a System of Private Law, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1073-74 (1975). 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 1073. 
 41  Joe Lapointe, HOCKEY; The N.H.L. Employs A Head Of Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
13, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/13/sports/hockey-the-nhl-employs-a-head-for-
business.html.  
 42  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 101. 
 43  NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11 
/nhl-constitution/. 
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The specific disciplinary powers of the NHL Commissioner 
are laid out in Section 6(j) of the NHL Constitution.44  The 
Commissioner has broad authority to punish a person 
connected with the league or a Member Club for violation of 
the league’s Constitution, By-Laws, or CBA.45  Any such 
action can occur during or outside the season, so long as the 
violation in question is detrimental to the league.46  In 
accordance with Section 6(j)(1), depending on the nature and 
severity of the violation, the Commissioner may take action 
against an unruly player or Member Club through various 
disciplinary methods such as expelling or suspending players, 
cancelling contracts, imposing steep monetary fines or team 
draft pick penalties, and compelling player transfers.47 
The Commissioner’s determinations are also “final and not subject 
to any review,” which further compounds the Commissioner’s extensive 
powers to admonish members of the league.48 
It might appear under the new CBA that the Commissioner’s powers 
have been limited, but this would be inaccurate.49  Under Article 18.13 of 
the NHL’s CBA, a player receiving a suspension of six games or more 
can circumvent the Commissioner’s plenary authority and appeal to a 
Neutral Discipline Arbitrator (“NDA”).50  The NDA shall “hold an in-
person hearing and shall determine whether the final decision of the 
League regarding whether the Player’s conduct violated the League 
Playing Rules and whether the length of the suspension imposed was 
supported by substantial evidence.”51  This secondary review “shall be 
binding and not subject to further review.”52  Before the implementation 
of the NHL’s CBA, the only instances in which the Commissioner’s 
decisions could be reviewed were: (1) when there was an expulsion from 
the league or a suspension of more than two years, or (2) when there was 
an imposition of a penalty that coincided with Section 6(j)(1)(d).53  In 
those instances, the player would have to appeal to the Board of 
 
 44  Id.  
 45  Id.  
 46  Id.  
 47  Id.  
 48  Id.  
 49  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 102.  
 50  Nat’l Hockey League & Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, art. 18, § 13 (Sept. 16, 2012).  Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
Nat’l Hockey League and the Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, art. XIIIV, § 13 (Feb. 2, 
2013), http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf [hereinafter 
2013 NHL CBA]. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id.  
 53  NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11 
/nhl-constitution/. 
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Governors, and could only prevail with a three-fourths majority vote.54 
Despite the changes made to the appeals process, there are those who 
still believe that the Commissioner has complete control over the NHL.55  
Holding the position for twenty-three years now, and having weathered 
three lockouts, Commissioner Bettman has increased revenue from $400 
million to $3.3 billion, garnering the support of the owners.56  “I think 
he’s emperor for life,” said Jonathon Gatehouse, author of the first in-
depth biography on Commissioner Bettman.57  In furtherance of his 
outright authority, Article 6.4 indemnifies the Commissioner from a 
range of pecuniary obligations, including damages and legal fees, 
provided that he act in good faith and in furtherance of the league.58  It 
would seem, despite the best efforts of the National Hockey League 
Players’ Association, that Commissioner Bettman has comprehensive 
disciplinary authority. 
C. The NBA Commissioner’s Authority 
As previously mentioned, it is commonly held that the NFL 
Commissioner has the most inherent power of any other league 
commissioner; however, a close examination of the NBA 
Commissioner’s authority brings that assertion into question.  Beyond 
direct disciplinary action, one of the strongest powers of the NBA 
Commissioner is the ability to “promulgate and enforce reasonable rules 
governing the conduct of players on the court or conduct that is harmful 
to the preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public 
confidence in, the game.”59  The NBA Commissioner’s ability to generate 
rules is arguably the most extensive of the four major sports leagues.60  
The NBA CBA also does not limit the rulemaking authority to conduct 
matters “on the playing court” and, instead, refers to “conduct in any area 
of the Arena.”61  “[A]ny area of the Arena” includes, but is not limited to, 
 
 54  Id. 
 55  Jeff Z. Klein, Bettman Undisputed N.H.L. Enforcer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/sports/hockey/on-hockey-bettman-is-the-undisputed-
nhl-enforcer.html.  
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 58  NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11 
/nhl-constitution/. 
 59  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n and the Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, art. VI, § 12 (2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/172760974/NBA-NBPA-CBA-
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 60  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49 (citing Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s 
Excessive Use of Rule-Making Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 215 (2007)). 
 61  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; see Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Nat’l 
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“locker rooms, dormitories, loading docks, and other back-of-house and 
underground areas, including those used by television production and 
other vehicles . . . at, during or in connection with an NBA Exhibition, 
All-Star, Regular Season or Playoff game.”62  Under the CBA, there is no 
requirement for the NBA to provide notice, negotiate, or receive consent 
before enacting any rule changes.63 
The authority of the NBA Commissioner to enforce disciplinary 
action is both subsumed under his ability to generate rules and expressed 
in CBA Article XXXI, Section 9.64  The extent of this authority, and how 
it can be disputed, is outlined in Article XXXI of the NBA’s CBA.65  This 
article lays out the “grievance and arbitration procedure and special 
procedures with respect to disputes involving player discipline.”66  Player 
discipline is broken down into two categories: suspension for twelve 
games or less and suspension for twelve games or more.67  For a 
suspension under twelve games issued by the Commissioner or his 
designee, there is no grievance review process and, thus, it will not be 
reviewable by an arbitrator.68  This punishment is disputable only to the 
commissioner—the person whose authority the suspension invokes—so, 
this subsequent ruling on appeal is final.69  However, the financial impact 
of such a suspension, whether it is through fine or loss of wages, may be 
reviewed by the Player Discipline Arbitrator.70  The Player Discipline 
Arbitrator may either maintain or lower, but not extend, the financial 
penalty on the player, and must keep all considerations private.71 
The guidelines in Section 9(b) of this Article dictate the procedure 
for situations involving players suspended for twelve games or more.72  
Such suspensions involve either player conduct or the protection of the 
integrity of the sport.73  Section 9(b) grants either the player or the union 
the ability to file for a review of the suspension.74  Sections 2–7 of this 
 
Basketball Ass’n and the Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, art. XXXI, § 9(c) (2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/172760974/NBA-NBPA-
CBA-2011 [hereinafter 2011 NBA CBA]. 
 62  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61. 
 63  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49. 
 64  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9.  
 65  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI. 
 66  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI. 
 67  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)-(b). 
 68  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a). 
 69  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(1)-(3). 
 70  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(5).  
 71  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(5)(b)-(c). 
 72  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).  
 73  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).  
 74  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b) (referring to Sec. 2(a). 
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Article articulate the exact procedure of the review.75  These proceedings 
are similar to court cases.76  There are pre-hearing motions, discovery, 
full hearings, and final rulings handed down by the Grievance 
Arbitrator.77  Like the MLB, either party can discharge the Grievance 
Arbitrator at any time before the Grievance Arbitrator delivers the final 
ruling.78  If the parties cannot agree on a new arbitrator, the parties shall 
jointly request a list of eleven attorneys from the International Institute 
for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“the CPR Institute”).79  If the 
parties cannot decide on a new arbitrator from that list, each party may 
eliminate up to five names before returning the list to the CPR Institute, 
who will then make a final selection.80  However, if at any time the 
Commissioner believes that the matter, in its essence, involves the 
integrity of the sport, he may implement the appeals procedure for 
penalties under twelve games, outlined supra.81  While it may seem that 
the Commissioner does not have complete authority to discipline 
players,82 the CBA grants the Commissioner full discretion in 
suspensions for twelve games and under and near-unfettered control in 
suspensions involving over twelve games.83 
D. The NFL Commissioner’s Authority 
The handling of the Deflategate scandal sparked the most recent 
issue of commissioner disciplinary authority.  While the NFL CBA is the 
primary source of the Commissioner’s authority, the NFL Constitution 
also sets forth important powers.84  “Article VIII of the NFL constitution 
details the commissioner’s power to resolve disputes and to take action 
against a person connected with the league when the person engages in 
conduct detrimental to the league.”85  In this capacity, 
The Commissioner is authorized, at the expense of the 
League, to hire legal counsel and take or adopt appropriate 
legal action or such other steps or procedures as he deems 
necessary and proper in the best interests of either the League 
or professional football, whenever a party or organization not 
a member of, employed by, or connected with the League or 
 
 75  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).  
 76  See 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 2-7. 
 77  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, §3-6. 
 78  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(a). 
 79  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(b). 
 80  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(b). 
 81  2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(d). 
 82  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103. 
 83  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103. 
 84  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103-04. 
 85  Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103-04 (citing NFL CONST. art VIII, § 6 (2006)). 
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any member thereof is guilty of any conduct detrimental to 
the League, its member clubs or employees, or to professional 
football.86 
The NFL is unique in that one can only appeal disciplinary decisions 
to the Commissioner; this may make the NFL’s disciplinary process seem 
much harsher than those of other professional sports leagues.87  The NFL 
CBA primarily covers playing rules, with a particular focus on player 
safety.88  There is an attempt to clarify the ambiguous powers of the 
Commissioner in the CBA, but the language utilized to ameliorate the 
ambiguity is itself ambiguous.89  The real issue of the ambiguity revolves 
around the Commissioner’s ability to punish “conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional 
football . . . .”90  This language is so broad and undefined that it could 
allow the Commissioner to interpret any transgression as fitting this 
category.  Such authority is woefully unfair to players.  The full list of the 
Commissioner’s disciplinary authority is outlined in Article 8, Section 
13, of the NFL Constitution, and is beyond the scope of this note, 
especially considering much of the constitution is inapplicable to player 
discipline.91  Also, there is a further expansion of his powers within the 
form player contract in Appendix A of the NFL CBA.92  Section 15 of 
the form contract is entitled “Integrity of the Game.”93  With this section, 
“the NFL Commissioner possesses the authority to discipline a player for 
‘conduct detrimental’ to the League under the NFL constitution, the NFL 
CBA, and a standard form NFL player contract.”94  Ostensibly, the NFL 
Commissioner seems to have a despotic rule above all others.  However, 
along with the intricate minutia of how each Commissioner enacts 
discipline, there is a unifying clause in all of the major sports leagues that 
augments their power beyond reason. 
E. The Ubiquity of “The Best Interest of the League” Clause 
The concept of a commissioner as protector of a league’s integrity 
dates back to the very creation of the position.  The inception of a “sports 
commissioner” came in 1921 in the MLB as a response to the “Black 
 
 86  NFL CONST. art VIII, § 6 (2006). 
 87  Wilson, supra note 17, at 49. 
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 90  2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 204. 
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Sox” scandal of the 1919 World Series.95  The original purpose of the 
MLB Commissioner was to serve as the ethical center of the sport, 
protecting its integrity and preventing ills, such as gambling, from 
blemishing it.96  Following the MLB’s decision, the other three major 
sports leagues eventually instituted the position of commissioner.97  The 
external limitations placed on each leagues’ commissioners can be found, 
primarily, in the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and, most 
likely, the First Amendment of the Constitution.98 
However, despite these external encumbrances, it seems as though 
each league has found a similar way to strengthen the authority of their 
respective commissioners.  As mentioned in each of the following 
sections, one of the commonalities we see amongst all four of the major 
sports leagues is language that gives the Commissioners authority to 
maintain the “best interests of the sport.”99  As such, they all are given 
substantial discretionary power that goes beyond certain textual 
limitations in order to maintain the ethereal essence of the sport.100  This 
extends to behavior both on and off the court, field, or ice that would 
challenge the integrity of the league.101  Apart from the expansive 
language of the clause, the “integrity” of each league is not specifically 
defined, and, therefore, it falls to each Commissioner to use his own 
judgment to determine what must be done to uphold this integrity.102  This 
authority is so far-reaching that no violation of any league rule is required 
for it to be activated, which severely limits the autonomy of league 
members beholden to the rules.103  While this “best interest” authority is 
not unlimited, considering it is constrained by the aforementioned CBA 
and Constitutional language, it is nonetheless significant.104  When the 
enumerated powers of each league’s commissioner are coupled with the 
authority of this clause, it becomes evident how each commissioner is 
similarly situated in their control over their respective sport in terms of 
disciplinary action. 
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE 
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ILLUSTRATED BY DEFLATEGATE 
There are many intricacies in the world of sports that could require 
legal intervention.  In 2015 alone, there were five major sports issues that 
arose across the nation: (1) free markets for college athletes; (2) college 
athletes’ right to unionize; (3) legalization of sports gambling; (4) 
antitrust litigation over territorial restraints and blackout rules; and (5) the 
NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary authority.105  While some of these 
issues may be external to the actual sport and its regulations, they 
implicate major areas of law from antitrust law to labor law.106  When 
reviewing the Deflategate controversy, one of the most prominent sports-
law issues, the authority of sports commissioners is brought to light.107  
This case is worth review not only because it is topical, but also because 
it illustrates the legal ramifications of the unfettered power of sports 
commissioners and how it should be mitigated through legislation. 
A. Deflategate: Before the Courts 
Deflategate involved Tom Brady using underinflated footballs in the 
2015 AFC championship game.108  In that game, the Colts’ safety, Mike 
Adams, intercepted Tom Brady twice and the Colts kept both balls, 
because the team believed the balls were not inflated correctly.109  It was 
reported that eleven of the twelve footballs allowed to the Patriots were 
under the NFL’s required range of 12.5 to 13.5 pounds per square inch.110  
It was also reported that the game referee, Walt Anderson, inspected the 
balls two hours and fifteen minutes before the game began, in accordance 
with protocol.111  As a result, the NFL hired Ted Wells as the league-
appointed attorney to complete an in-depth investigation into the 
matter.112  The investigation culminated in a 243-page report that 
implicated Tom Brady, as well as some of the Patriots’ staff members.113  
The primary conclusion was that Tom Brady was probably “at least 
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generally aware” that the footballs used were underinflated.114  The report 
also posited the likelihood “that Jim McNally [the Official Locker Room 
attendant for the Patriots] and John Jastremski [an equipment assistant for 
the Patriots] participated in a deliberate effort to release air from the 
Patriots’ game balls after they were examined by the referee.”115  There 
were also text messages exchanged between the two staffers discussing 
footballs and their level of inflation.116  However, the report found no 
conclusive evidence implicating the team coach, Bill Belichick, or team 
management in the deflation practice.117 
Due to these findings, the NFL ruled that Tom Brady would be 
suspended without pay for the first four games of the 2015-2016 NFL 
season.118  The NFL also decided to take punitive action against the New 
England Patriots team, fining it $1 million and taking away its 2016 first-
round and 2017 fourth-round draft picks.119  The Patriots issued a 
statement expressing its belief that the findings of the Wells Report were 
incomplete, and that the report did not include evidence of the natural 
reduction of PSI in the footballs.120  The statement also said there was no 
evidence that Tom Brady had a preference for underinflated balls.121  In 
spite of this, the Patriots decided not to appeal the decision of the NFL.122  
However, the National Football League’s Players’ Association appealed 
the decision on Tom Brady’s behalf.123  After deciding not to recuse 
himself from the internal appeal hearing, Commissioner Goodell upheld 
the suspension based on the protection of the “integrity of the game,” 
something he held to be the most important of the commissioner’s 
duties.124  Part of this decision was a result of Brady instructing his 
assistant to destroy his cell phone that he used since November—a period 
of time including the AFC Championship game and the early 
investigation—the day he was interviewed by Ted Wells.125  As a result 
of their inability to reach any sort of resolution, Brady and Goodell went 
before Judge Richard M. Berman of the United States District Court for 
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the Southern District of New York.126  The judge urged them to settle, but 
ultimately decided that the positions of the parties were too disparate and 
that he would hand down a ruling. 127 
B. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n 
While the judge addressed the court’s usual deference to an 
arbitrator’s findings and accepted his findings, he nevertheless decided 
that the decision should be vacated.128  The award in favor of Brady was 
granted on three legal grounds: 
(A) inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential discipline 
(four-game suspension) and his alleged misconduct; (B) 
denial of the opportunity for Brady to examine one of two 
lead investigators, namely NFL Executive Vice President and 
General Counsel Jeff Pash; and (C) denial of equal access to 
investigative files, including witness interview notes.129 
In response to Brady’s lack of suspension notice, the court drew a 
parallel between the NFL’s decision and how the league treats steroid 
use.130  The court found that Brady had no notice of a possible suspension 
equivalent to the use of performance-enhancing drugs or general 
awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs.131  The court also found that 
the suspension could not be based on Brady’s failure to cooperate with 
an ensuing investigation.132  While Goodell thought suspending Brady 
was consistent with the practice of punishing steroid use—reasoning that 
both gave the violators a competitive advantage—the court disagreed.133  
As a result, the court held that no player alleged or found to have had 
general awareness of inappropriate ball deflation by other parties and 
failed to cooperate with the investigation could be considered to have 
reasonable notice of a punishment equivalent to NFL Policy on Anabolic 
Steroid and Related Substances use.134 
Based on this reasoning, the court found additional grounds to 
vacate Brady’s suspension.135  The court found that Brady’s general 
awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs did not amount to notice of 
possible punitive action.136  The court concluded that, “as a matter of law, 
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no NFL policy or precedent notifies players that they may be disciplined 
(much less suspended) for general awareness of misconduct by others.”137  
The lack of precedent within the NFL, thus, violated the “law of the 
shop”: “A rule must clearly and unambiguously establish the scope of 
prohibited conduct, as well as the consequences of violations, in order to 
be enforceable . . . .”138  The “law of the shop” refers to “when an 
arbitrator enforces a past practice,” something that was not applicable 
here due to lack of precedent.139 
Finally, the court distinguished between notice of a fine and notice 
of a suspension.140  The court found that, under the Player’s Policy, a 
player has notice of a potential fine.141  However, Brady was punished 
under the Competitive Integrity Policy, which is only incorporated in the 
Game Operations Manual that applies to the chief executive, presidents, 
general managers, and head coaches—but not players.142  Goodell, in 
response, contended that conduct detrimental to the league, rather than 
the Competitive Integrity Policy, was the basis for Brady’s 
punishment.143  The court stated that a player’s right to notice is 
quintessential to the CBA, as well as criminal and civil justice systems.144  
The court’s holding in favor of Brady was also based on past NFL arbitral 
precedent that the lack of notice of the Competitive Integrity Policy is 
grounds for dispensing with punishment.145 
In terms of conduct detrimental to the league, the court dismissed 
that argument based on NFL precedent.146  For example, in the domestic 
violence cases of Ray Rice and Adrian Peterson, the NFL initially 
punished them on the grounds of conduct detrimental to the league, but 
ultimately punished them based on the NFL’s policy against domestic 
violence.147  As such, the situations are not analogous.  Also, the court 
found that Brady was denied equal opportunity to examine Co-Lead 
Investigator Jeff Pash.148  NFL precedent dictates that, in Article 46 
arbitration appeals, players must be given the opportunity to confront 
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their investigators.149  Consequently, Brady was unfairly prejudiced.150  
In that same vein, the court found that Goodell improperly denied Brady 
equal access to investigative files.151  Lastly, Brady contended that 
Goodell was “evidently partial” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 
10(a)(2), which will be essential to the legislation this paper proposes.152 
C. Goodell’s Appeal: NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n 
In the wake of the court’s decision, Goodell appealed the case to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.153  The Second 
Circuit reversed the ruling of the lower court on several grounds.154  First, 
in regards to the Player Policies, the circuit court agreed that the policies 
did not apply, but did not foreclose the possibility of suspensions.155  
Normally, under the Player Policies, tampering with equipment only 
called for a fine.156  While the policy under the Other Uniform/Equipment 
Violations section mentions nothing about tampering with balls, the court 
found that Article 46 gives the Commissioner broad authority to deal with 
conduct that goes against the integrity of the game.157  Also, while this 
section cites fines for first-time offenses, the court noted that these fines 
are minimums and can be augmented based on the severity of the 
violation.158 
In terms of the steroid comparison, the circuit court found little issue 
with it, in contrast with the lower court.159  The court recognized that 
arbitrators are given broad latitude in their decisions.160  While Brady had 
the right to notice of potential punishment, there is no enumerated right 
that Brady is given notice to analogies made by the arbitrator that would 
inform their decision.161  Thus, while the court found the comparison 
imperfect, the Commissioner was still within his rights, because this issue 
was not essential for his punishment.162 
In regards to the issue of awareness of the underinflated balls, the 
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court found that the Wells Report did not limit itself to the standard of 
general awareness, but rather that report determined that was the most 
likely level of awareness, rather than direct involvement or potential 
awareness.163  The real issue here for the Commissioner was whether the 
discipline he imposed was within his Article 46 powers to protect the 
integrity of the league.164  The court found that, in conjunction with the 
evidence presented from the Wells Report, and other exigent 
circumstances surrounding the investigation, there was a factual basis for 
Goodell to determine that Brady committed a punishable offense.165  
Therefore, the court held that the Commissioner was within his rights to 
find that Brady participated in conduct detrimental to the league.166 
The court also found that there were grounds to punish Brady for 
non-cooperation with the investigation.167  Again the court found that the 
league had authority under Article 46 detrimental conduct, but also 
because of Brady’s general notice of the investigation.168  The court 
reasoned that Brady was on notice of potential punishment for destroying 
his phone when he received a letter from the league stating that he failed 
“to cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by 
refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, 
etc.).”169  Also, the court noted that any reasonable litigant would 
understand that the destruction of evidence days before an arbitration 
hearing would be a substantial issue.170  The court also dismissed the issue 
of the Competitive Integrity Policy, stating the Brady was clearly being 
punished under Article 46.171 
On the issue of exclusion of testimony from the NFL General 
Counsel, the court found that any of Pash’s insight into the matter was 
collateral to the arbitration and it was not necessary that Brady be privy 
to it.172  The court also found that the Commissioner did not receive any 
extensive information from any of the members of counsel that fell 
beyond that of the Wells Report and what was disclosed in hearings and 
the previous case.173  With regard to the denial of access to investigative 
files, the court found that the Commissioner himself did not rely on any 
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internal interview notes in making his decision.174  Therefore, it was not 
unreasonable for him to assume that Brady would require access to 
them.175  Finally, the court found no merit to the issue of the 
Commissioner being an evidently partial arbitrator.176  The court cited, 
yet again, the Article 46 authority of the Commissioner to determine what 
constitutes conduct detrimental to the league.177  As such, the Second 
Circuit reinstated the four-game suspension and the fine.178 
IV. LEGISLATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE “BEST INTEREST OF THE 
LEAGUE” CLAUSE 
A. Why Commissioner’s Broad Authority Is Unfair and Creates 
Wide-Ranging Problems 
In the wake of the Second Circuit’s decision, Brady decided not to 
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, accepting the suspension.179  
While it is unclear how the Supreme Court would have ruled, the decision 
clearly illustrates the overly-broad authority delegated to Roger Goodell 
in his duty to protect the best interest of the league.180  Further, the issue 
is not limited to the NFL Commissioner, as illustrated in Part II.  So, the 
question remains: what can be done? 
One might ask: Why is change necessary, considering that these 
leagues are extremely profitable and popular?181  Apart from the looming 
issues of player dissatisfaction in some of the leagues,182 issues may also 
arise when each leagues’ CBA expires and it becomes time for the 
players’ unions and the leagues to renegotiate.183  Firstly, as the 
commissioners’ authorities increase, discipline is likely to increase, 
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resulting in the loss of salary through suspensions and fines, which can 
be significant for lower level players who do not play as long and make 
less money.184  Another reason relates more to player freedom, regarding 
whether players should be suspended for non-sports affiliated 
activities.185  A commissioner does not need to wait for a guilty verdict 
in a criminal matter to punish a player for actions he finds detrimental to 
the sport.186  This practice goes against the societal and legal norm of 
innocent until proven guilty; however, sports leagues are private 
organizations that players enter freely.187  Nevertheless, this still is an 
incentive for players to want to renegotiate.188 
A secondary question is whether or not leagues should fine players 
for non-criminal activity that occurred off the court.189  There are serious 
implications here that could violate a player’s right to free speech, and 
put their political, religious, and social beliefs at risk.190  As players begin 
to act out in different ways, new rules are promulgated to regulate their 
behavior.191  Any player that feels as though the league has too much 
control over his personal life may feel disenchanted with the sport and 
face further action due to acts of frustration.192 
A final consideration for why legislation is necessary is the 
economic ramifications of dissatisfaction with commissioner authority 
that could result in strikes and lockouts.193  One such example is the 2011-
2012 NBA season lockout.194  While this strike was primarily based on 
the allocation of money from various sources, the economic effects are 
explanatory.195  Because of the reduction of the season from eighty-two 
to sixty-six games, the players lost roughly twenty percent of their 
salaries.196  The NBA players are guaranteed 51.2% of all basketball-
related income.197  The lockout resulted in a revenue loss of about $3.3 
billion, half of which was borne by the players.198  If legislation was 
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enacted to settle any disputes that could arise during a CBA negotiation 
year, it could result in the saving of millions, if not billions, of dollars. 
Examining how the commissioners are compensated in comparison 
to the average player is illustrative of how entrenched the position of 
commissioner is and raises questions of self-dealing.  This further 
indicates a need to mitigate commissioner positions in the major sports 
leagues.  Respectively, the average salaries for players in the NBA, MLB, 
NHL, and NFL (in 2014) and their potential career earnings are as 
follows: $5.15 million, $3.2 million, $2.4 million, and $1.9 million.199  
Over the course of an average NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL career, these 
averages, respectively, allow for career earnings of: $24.7 million, $17.9 
million, $13.2 million, and $6.7 million.200  These figures, when 
compared to the salaries of the commissioners of these leagues, show a 
stark contrast in the yearly and career earning potentials.  Based on 
figures from 2010, Bud Selig, the Commissioner of the MLB, earned 
$18.35 million in 2007, with only ten players earning more than him at 
the time.201  The NFL Commissioner was the second highest earner, 
taking in $8 million in 2009, after taking a twenty-five percent pay cut.202  
The third and fourth highest paid commissioners were the NBA and NHL 
Commissioners, earning a “modest” $10 and $7.2 million respectively.203  
These figures have likely increased in the near decade that has passed 
since their recording, as have the players’ averages, but the contrast is 
still as appalling.  These earning figures become even more concerning 
when considering the recent history of the duration of sports 
commissioners’ tenure.  The previous NBA Commissioner, David Stern, 
served for thirty years in his position.204  The next longest tenured 
commissioners are the previous MLB Commissioner Bud Selig who 
served for twenty-four years, including time as active and formal 
Commissioner,205 and NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman who has served 
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for roughly the same amount of time.206  While NFL Commissioner 
Roger Goodell has only served since 2006, a meager eleven years, he is 
an example of the self-dealing inherent to the position.207  It is widely 
known that Goodell was groomed for the job by his predecessor, Paul 
Tagliabue, as was the current NBA Commissioner Adam Silver.208  While 
the owners are required to vote, the unanimity in both instances strongly 
suggests a dynastic system. 
Some people have offered alternatives to legislation, such as a player 
conduct policy (“PCP”).209  This would undoubtedly be something 
generated by CBA negotiations, rather than unilaterally by either the 
players or the league.210  A PCP would specifically enumerate how 
players are meant to comport themselves, alleviating some confusion.211  
However, the specifics would have to be negotiated, which could result 
in a lockout or ambiguous rules.212  Furthermore, PCP would still leave 
the issue of player autonomy off the court, and would do little to lessen 
the “best interest of the league” authority, which “[s]cholars have 
criticized [because] this model of a commissioner sitting as accuser, 
judge, and jury . . . gives rise to perceived, if not real, bias.”213  As 
previously alluded to, this could run afoul of restriction of “evident 
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators” provision of 9 U.S.C. § 
10(a)(2).214 
As such, proposed legislation that would make ambiguous clauses, 
such as the “best interest of the league” clause, a violation of players’ 
rights would be beneficial.  This legislation could stand on its own or 
become a provision of some other federal legislation, such as the Federal 
Labor Relations Act.  Congress would have the authority to implement 
such legislation under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which allows regulation of interstate commerce, and would 
apply to all major sports leagues.  The primary issue here is that many of 
the leagues have teams in Canada, which would require a separate source 
of authority. 
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This legislation would require each league to specifically enumerate 
all possible infractions punishable as players of the league, if they do not 
go so far as to infringe upon their First Amendment rights.  The 
legislation would also prevent athletes from being punished for criminal 
behavior if they are not found guilty.  Finally, the legislation would 
require that all disciplinary hearings be appealable to a panel of 
arbitrators, independent of the league.  The panel would be provided by 
one or several outside arbitration sources to ensure impartiality.  The 
players’ union and the league will retain the right to remove one or 
multiple arbitrators from the panel at any time, if they can show good 
cause.  In such an instance, they would have no say in the replacement 
arbitrators. 
B. Privacy and Constitutional Rights Legislation 
This section will propose extensions of privacy laws and state-
adopted constitutional principles in order to mitigate major sports 
leagues’ commissioner authority to take punitive actions.  This section 
will not argue that there are alterations to commissioner authority in 
regard to on-field and other related activities, because those powers are 
strongly enumerated and extend beyond the scope of its purpose.215  The 
first legislative proposal addresses how players are often subject to 
double punishment for criminal activity, as well as an invasion of their 
rights to privacy during legal proceedings that do not involve the sports 
leagues.  This parallels a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.216  Traditionally, this provision has 
offered three constitutional protections: (1) protection from a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.217  
Admittedly, this does not apply here, because double jeopardy only 
applies to government action,218 but that is why there is a call for 
legislation to mirror its applicability to private entities.  There is clear 
precedent for expanding constitutional protections through either state or 
federal action.  One example of a state law expanding constitutional rights 
is N.J.S.A. 2A: 161A-1.219  As explained in State v. Evans, this statute 
expands the rights of detainees relating to unlawful search and seizure, 
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which is derived originally from the Fourth Amendment.220  If players 
were to be punished or acquitted by the courts only to face punishment 
from the league, it would completely contravene this essential 
Constitutional principal.  Many state constitutions have adopted the 
principle of double jeopardy and can apply it as they see fit, as long as it 
does not contradict Supreme Court precedent.221  As such, “[s]tate courts 
can also interpret any double jeopardy clauses in their own state 
constitutions which often provide more protection than that which is 
afforded by the federal constitution since the minimum standards under 
the U.S. Constitution always apply.”222  States that have adopted heftier 
protections include: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and 
Texas.223  With enhanced protections like these extended to athletes and 
fines for non-sports related offenses, the ability of commissioners to 
commit double jeopardy violations would be extinguished. 
While this is an extreme example, and there are other exigencies that 
would need to be considered, the case of Aaron Hernandez is informative 
in how a sports league could violate the principle of double jeopardy.224  
In an effort to avoid a publicity nightmare, Roger Goodell made it a point 
to wait until Aaron Hernandez was convicted of murder to suspend 
him.225  Obviously, suspending Hernandez subsequent to his conviction 
would make little sense considering the charges would call for a life 
sentence, but the point still stands.226  Assuming a player was convicted 
of a more innocuous crime, like drug possession, a conviction could 
warrant a suspension or fine in the eyes of a league commissioner, 
providing double punishment.  This note proposes that legislation should 
be created that would prevent sports leagues from punishing players for 
crimes, at least of the non-violent nature.  This is not meant to promote 
non-violent crimes, such as marijuana use, but to protect players as 
private citizens. 
In fact, it could be argued that such treatment by sports leagues 
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perpetuate a false narrative about athletes as criminals, bordering on 
defamation.  As players in the most popular sport in America, many 
players rise to the level of public figures, but the way many are 
represented in the media, and the way leagues handle such publicity, 
often casts them in a false light.227  Taking the NFL—the league with the 
most players—as an example, demonstrates that athletes are generally 
less likely to commit crimes than the average person, despite the rampant 
reports of misconduct.228  One study found that the rates of pro-athletes 
committing assault or domestic violence were half that of the general 
population.229  However, teams and leagues do not view players as 
people, but rather as market commodities that can bring in great revenue, 
but also terrible publicity.230  Teams have often stood by players in 
support of them, adhering to the principle of “innocent until proven 
guilty.”  However, many teams and leagues are quick to repudiate their 
stars in order to protect their own image, even at the expense of the 
players involved.231  While this would likely be protected under free 
speech, teams and leagues alike should be wary of speaking too soon on 
an issue. 
C. Arbitration Legislation 
It has been established that the “best interest of the league” clause is 
detrimental to sports and players, promoting this proposal for legislation.  
The clause gives commissioners too much authority, even when there is 
an arbitration process involved.  The proposal would create legislation 
that would include a uniform arbitration process across all of the major 
sports leagues.  This process would serve to be impartial, as well as strip 
the “best interest of the league” authority from the Commissioners. 
The proposal would mandate that arbitration for any transgression 
related to the sport be brought before an impartial panel comprised of 
arbitrators that work independently of any league.  The process would be 
similar to standing arbitration process in the MLB, but with certain 
distinctions.232  A list of names would be provided by an independent 
arbitration entity—one that the players’ association and the league have 
agreed upon.233  Once a consensus is reached about who the arbitrators 
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will be, then the process can continue.  If either party has an issue with 
any of the arbitrators, they will have to show cause to have them removed 
from the panel.  Examples of justifiable cause could be that the arbitrator 
is biased or unqualified or not in the right state-of-mind to participate in 
the proceedings, but there must be cause.  It will not be the case, like in 
the MLB arbitration system, that a party can remove an arbitrator at their 
whim.  Nor will it be like in voir dire where each party receives a certain 
number of jurors that they may dismiss without cause.  If adequate cause 
cannot be shown, the arbitrator will remain on the panel.  At the end of 
the arbitration, if either party is not satisfied, they can take the matter to 
the courts.  However, if a party chooses to litigate the matter and is 
unsuccessful, the losing party will be responsible for the opposing party’s 
attorney’s fees. 
This system will allow for a truly fair way to determine what 
punishment is suitable for a given transgression, especially when the 
constitution, by-laws, and the CBA are ambiguous on an issue.  If such 
an issue of ambiguity arises, the team owners will vote on how it will be 
interpreted, and the arbitrators can proceed from there.  It is still up to the 
players’ associations and the leagues to negotiate the CBAs and what 
infractions are punishable, but the punishments will not be left to parties 
that have a vested interest in the outcome.  Only with these legislative 
changes will players, in all types of situations, be treated fairly and 
impartially. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In summation, since the inception of the position in 1921, the 
authority of sports commissioners has grown to an unacceptable level.  
Primarily driven by the “best interest of the league clause,” 
commissioners’ power must be checked through legislation in order to 
promote the best interests not only of the leagues, but also their numerous 
players.  Without such legislation, players will remain in the precarious 
position of negotiating CBAs that leave them open to unfair disciplinary 
action. 
 
